As we have already seen it, Hitler was just a lieutenant of Jewish leaders (as Roosevelt, Stalin, Churchill, Blum, Mussolini, Franco, etc…). His main role was to allow the creation of Israel and to push ordinary jews to emigrate there. Once his work accomplished, he wouldn't be needed anymore. So, his role as Nazi leader was meant to last only a limited period of time. It means he had to succeed at the beginning, and then to start losing. As all the sides were under control, the entire war was staged (by Jewish leaders).
Regarding the Russian campaign, Hitler's army was supposed to be vastly superior and to have great successes at the beginning, and very soon after, to stop winning. As the result couldn't be left to chance, Hitler the Jewish agent (and his generals) had to make voluntary mistakes in order to lose at the end. Same thing for Stalin.
Let's see the official history.
Before Operation Barbarossa
Even before the Russian campaign, Hitler has made errors.
He doesn't mobilize all Germany. This will lead to a lack of soldiers during Barbarossa and after. It will also lead to a lack of equipment.
German tanks have a very complicated design; thus, they are produced extremely slowly. Whereas Russian tanks are much more standardized and can be produced en masse.
Even if German soldiers were trained in Russia during the rearmament period, it seems that German generals don't know the rasputitsa (moment of the year when the ground becomes very muddy). Therefore, their tanks aren't adapted to it.
1941: operation Barbarossa
Anyway, Hitler invades Russia in June 22 1941. Stalin is totally surprised by the invasion, thus the Russian army is unprepared. Because of that, the disorganization is complete. The German army is also largely superior to the Russian one (better organization, more mobile, better officers, etc…). It allows Germans forces to win easily at first, using blitzkrieg strategy.
There are three German army groups (north, center, and south).
Army Group Center is the most powerful. It's the one which makes most of the prisoners. By using blitzkrieg, they encircle Russians at Bialystok and Minsk between 22nd June and 3rd July and make at first 420.000 soldiers. 1.500 canons, 2.500 tanks and 1.669 airplanes are also captured. But, the encirclement is not perfect and many soldiers are able to escape, thus, only 290.000 are taken at the end.
For Army Group North, the strategy was different. They weren't supposed to encircle Russian troops, but to make a breakthrough with the panzers and make them advance as quickly as possible toward Leningrad.
Army Group South beats Russian at Brody, between June 23-29. The 9th July, they are at 75 km of Kiev and 40 km after Ternopil.
As Germany shouldn't win, first mistakes and fatalities had to happen after the first success. Otherwise, Germans would have won very quickly.
Army Group Center progresses very fast. The 10th July, they are at Smolensk. The 16th July, Smolensk falls. Germans have already advanced 650 km. It's an incredible success.
The first mistakes come with Army Group North. The panzers progress very fast too. In only 4 days they have made 300 km and are on the Dvina River (the 26th June). But suddenly, there are ordered to stop during 6 days; this because Leeb (who command the army group) thinks their flank is exposed. It destroys totally the momentum of the attack. Besides that, a part of the infantry of army group north is sent to the east in order to participate to attack Russians at Polotsk (the 14th July). It also participates to lose momentum of army group north. But, starting again, the 4th July, panzers are at Ostrov, which is 220 km farer than the Dvina River. And the 14, they are on the Louga River. Leningrad is now only 120 km ahead. But, once again they are stopped during 6 days, this time in order to resupply. Once again, the momentum of the attack is destroyed.
Army group south encircles Russians at Uman between the 15th July and the 8th August. There are 200.000 Russians killed and 100.000 who are made prisoners.
After the 16th July, Army group center should continue to advance. Even if Russians have succeeded in reconstituting a front, Germans are now very superior. However, nothing happens. Why? Because the 19th July (some say the 23), Hitler has ordered almost all panzers of army group center to be sent to south-east, toward Kiev (directive 33) and to north-west. Then, deprived from vital troops, Germans are blocked on Smolensk. Until the end of September, that is during two months and ten days, front center won't move.
Some don't consider this as a mistake because the success at Kiev allowed Germans to destroy an indeed dangerous salient and to have 615.000 Russians killed or prisoners.
However, many people think it's a mistake because Moscow was a big transport center (railroads, roads), apart from the fact that it was an administrative center and the capital of Russia. Everything coming from south to north-west passed by Moscow. So if Moscow had been taken, all soviet armies at the north would have been destroyed easily, because of the lack of supply. And all German armies from north-west would then have been available to fight with army group center.
Because of this dispersion of the German forces, the assault on Moscow is delayed of 2 months and 10 days. When Germans attack Moscow at the end of September, it's too late. The winter is there very quickly; and Russians have been able to reinforce and to make defense lines. Germans can't take Moscow. And after December, Russian reinforcements from Siberia enable them to make Germans retreat.
On the north front, reinforcement from army group center wasn't enough to enable Germans to take Leningrad.
During 1941 and the beginning of 1942, Germans have lost almost 800.000 soldiers. In 1942, they can't continue to attack everywhere as they have done during 1941. They can attack only on one part of the front.
1942: operation "case blue"
Hitler decides to attack at the south of the front, in order to take oil from Caucasus. At first sight, the goal is not stupid, since without oil from Caucasus, Russians won't be able to continue the war. But once again, there will be multiple mistakes which will prevent Germans to obtain a success.
In order to reach this goal, army group south is separated into two groups: army group A (Caucasus campaign) and army group B (Volga campaign). Army group B will reach Stalingrad in order to cut the road of Caucasus to the Russian forces. During a hypothetic second phase of the plan, Germans are supposed to go to the north toward Kazan. Army group A will go to the Caucasus in order to take control of oil wells and refineries.
Army Group A, under Wilhelm List (Caucasus campaign)
- First Panzer Army
- Seventeenth Army
- Third Romanian Army
- Eleventh Army
Army Group B, under Maximilian von Weichs (Volga campaign)
- Second Army
- Fourth Panzer Army
- Sixth Army
- Second Hungarian Army
- Fourth Romanian Army
- Eighth Italian Army
Having two army groups is already quite dangerous, since Germans are greatly diluting their force.
The campaign begins the 28th June 1942, so, lately once again.
But in fact, one month before this, the second battle of Kharkov (May 12-28) led to the surrounding of 270.000 Russian soldiers. It gave Germans the opportunity to progress during some months on the southern front without encountering too much opposition.
The second thing which made that Germans had little opposition during some times is that when they launched their offensive on the southern front, Stalin thought their final objective was Moscow. He thought they would turn north toward Moscow after Voronezh. Thus, he decided to reinforce front center near Voronezh rather than the southern one.
Here is the map:
At the beginning of the campaign, everywhere Russians retreat. The 5th July, Group B is at Voronej. But, as the Fourth Panzer Army is involved in the battle for this town, Germans lose time and aren't able to encircle Russians. These are able to flee. Russians have learned from last year, and retreat instead of fighting. Then, because Germans find only scattered troops, Hitler think it's the debacle for Russians and that victory is near.
Regarding Army Group A, they are able to take Rostov the 23rd July, but once again, are unable to encircle the Russian forces.
Army Group B is progressing very quickly toward Stalingrad. The 22nd July, they are at 60 km north-west of Stalingrad, on the Don River.
However, they don't attack; because Fourth Panzer Army has been sent to the south to help Army Group A to cross the Don River (the river makes a bend, so it's the same river near Stalingrad and in Rostov). As the Sixth Army was advancing very fast, Hitler thought it could go to Stalingrad alone. But now, they find important resistance from Soviet troops on the left side of the Don and are conscious the Sixth Army can't beat the Russian forces alone especially at Stalingrad.
Fourth Panzer Army takes Kotelnikovo the 2nd August. Then, they are sent to the north to join the Sixth Army in order to help it crossing the Don and taking Stalingrad. But before that, Fourth Panzer Army is split into two: one part trying to go to the Caspian Sea, the other part joining the Sixth Army.
The Sixth Army crosses the Don only the 23rd August. The 24th August, they are on the suburb of Stalingrad.
The 29th August, the Sixth Army could encircle Russians. But once again, a counter-attack prevents them from doing this.
Having made its junction with the Fourth Panzer Army (September 2), the Sixth Army enter Stalingrad the 12th September.
A frontal battle begins. Wikipedia says: "To deal with the complete air superiority of the Luftwaffe, the commander of the 62nd Army, General Vasily Chuikov, ordered his troops to engage the Germans in close quarters fighting ('hugging' the enemy), rendering the German superiority in combined arms tactics almost useless. The Luftwaffe nevertheless played a crucial role, as it suppressed Soviet artillery on the eastern bank of the Volga and caused heavy casualties to the Soviet attempts to reinforce the defenders over the river."
The battle lasts from mid-September to mid-November. Germans capture 90 % of the town.
At the beginning of November, anticipating victory, Hitler decides to withdraw a substantial number of aircrafts to the Mediterranean.
The 19th November, Russians launch "operation Uranus" which leads to the encirclement of the Sixth Army and parts of the Fourth Panzer Army which are in Stalingrad. Flanks are mainly guarded by Romanian, Hungarian, and Italian soldiers, who are exhausted and poorly equipped.
Then, instead of ordering the Sixth Army to break out, Hitler orders it to remain on the defensive.
They are supposed to be resupplied by air. But of course such a task is far over the capabilities of the Luftwaffe. Thus, the ability of the Sixth Army to resist decreases more and more, and Russians are able to take back the northern part of the city.
To break the encirclement, Army Group Don is created at the south of Stalingrad. The 12th December, the attack is launched. They progress up to 48 km of the south flank of the Sixth Army, but are unable to go further. The Sixth Army still don't try to escape the encirclement and stay in defensive mode (following the initial order from Hitler).
2nd February 1943, 300.000 remaining German soldiers of the Sixth Army surrender at Stalingrad.
Following this, Russians launch "operation little Saturn" the 16th December. After some battles, 85.000 Italians and 60.000 Hungarians are made prisoners, and 100.000 Hungarians are killed. Almost all the territory gained during operation "case blue" is lost.
Let's go back to Army Group A. After having taken Rostov the 23rd July, they progress very fast. The 9th August, they are at Maykop, 300 km away from Rostov.
Then they go west and east of Caucasus. On the west side, they take Novorossisk the 10th September. On the east side, they take Mozdok the 25th August, and they cross the Terek River, near Grozny on September 2.
After that, the progression is very slow. They take Nalchik (90 km south-west of Mozdok) only the 27th October. Then, they take Alagir (65 km south-east of Nalchik) the 5th November.
What happens is that Russians stop retreating, and once again logistic problem arose.
In November, after several unsuccessful Soviet counterattacks, Germans decide to remain on the defensive, waiting for the spring of 1943 to resume the offensive if Stalingrad operations proved successful.
Finally, with the disaster of Stalingrad, Army group A is forced to retreat in order to avoid isolation from the rest of the German army.
Something interesting is that the Luftwaffe had the possibility of bombing oil wells and refineries of Grozny. But Hitler ordered the bombing only at the beginning of October. And on October 8, he specified that it could be done only before October 14, because aircrafts were needed for Stalingrad. Thus, bombings were done on Grozny only between the 10th and the 12th October. And at Grozny (and Maykop, which had already been taken) there was only 10 % of oil production. 90 % was at Baku (460 km at the south of Grozny, on the Caspian Sea). Germans bombers could have bombed it in August, when there was almost no Russian aircrafts there. But, no order was given at this moment.
During 1942, Germans have lost many men and material. So, in 1943, they can't even afford anymore to make a general attack on a part of the front. They can just afford to attack Russians on a limited part of it. This one is located at Kursk. But the preparation of the attack takes too much time, and because of that, Russian forces know that Hitler will attack there, and thus are extremely well prepared. Of course, the attack is a failure. After that, Germans will never be able to make such a powerful attack anymore. They are now doomed to fail.
There are several problems with the official version:
- Why was Stalin so surprised by the war, when he had transferred all the military industry behind Ural (after 1936) precisely because he expected a war against Germany? In 1936, he was sure a war would happen, but just days before it, he didn't believe it anymore. Quite bizarre isn't it?
- How could Stalin be surprised by the invasion, when he knew that the whole German army was mobilized just behind the frontier? It doesn't make sense. Historians say Stalin thought it was just a threat and told his generals not to react to this provocation. But you can't believe in such a thing when the whole army is just behind the frontier and your secret services tell you the invasion is imminent, especially with someone as erratic as Hitler, and who had invaded so many countries in just two years. And even if you believe it's just a threat, you send your army, and put it in maximum alert, just in case. So, the reaction of Stalin is extremely fishy.
- And if Stalin feared a war against Germany, why did he make the Great purges which totally disorganized the soviet army? Not really the good moment for doing that.
- German lost 800.000 men during 1941. But they sent the same amount of men for reinforcement during the beginning of 1942. Thus, in 1942, Germans should have still been vastly superior to Russians, and they should have been able to attack at least on two fronts. So, how could the German armies be so weak in 1942 that they were able to attack Russians only on one part of the front?
- Funny, there was no collapse of the Russian army on several points of the front as there was with the Anglo-French army. The Russian army was even less mobile, was less organized, and was much more surprised about the German attack than the Anglo-French army was. But no, no collapse of the front, no chaos. What a chance.
- How could Russians avoid so easily encirclements by just retreating, since they were supposed to have problem of mobility and since encirclements were made by panzer armies, which were extremely mobile?
- During operation case blue (1942), how could Hitler and German generals believe erroneously that Russians were in full flight, since they could see with their planes that it wasn't the case at all?
- Why did Hitler absolutely want to take Stalingrad, while it had no strategic value and the battle would obviously lead to huge losses of men since the German army couldn't use blitzkrieg there?
- Why did Hitler maintain the attack of Stalingrad, while he was perfectly informed that Russians were amassing tons of troops on his flanks?
- Why didn't Hitler try to recruit non-Russian people (and even Russian ones) to fight against Soviets? As communism and Russia (for Non-Russians) were not appreciated at all by people, they would have been more than willing to fight against the Soviet army.
Knowing what we already know about Hitler, it is clear that if things happened the way they did, it's because the defeat was planned since the beginning. Hitler's strategic and organizational mistakes were made voluntarily.
Hitler had to win at the beginning. Otherwise: 1) He couldn't have gathered Russian jews; 2) Germans wouldn't have got enough time to make the so called holocaust (of course, it's a lie, but we are talking about official history here); 3) it would have seemed strange that he was beaten so quickly after all the previous successes; 4) the front could have stayed immobile, none of both camp being able to take the advantage. But, as Jewish leaders had sold the concept of German Blitzkrieg to the world, it would have seemed strange that suddenly, the war was like WWI and that Germans weren't able to make a massive breakthrough; 5) as England and the USA were not ready yet to invade Germany, Stalin would have possessed all Europe if he had won. And that's not what was planned by Jewish leaders. Or Russia would have not taken all those territories from Central Europe, but then, there wouldn't have been the very powerful Soviet Bloc. And Jewish leaders wanted this. Or Stalin would have taken the territories from Central Europe as he did historically. But then, without the Allied forces in front of him, it would have been difficult to explain why he didn't take more territories.
This is because Hitler had to win at the beginning that we are said that Stalin didn't believe in the invasion and forced his troops to stay inactive during the first day of the battle. It made it easier to explain the retreat of the Russians.
But, of course, Hitler should not win completely. And he had to make mistakes: before Operation Barbarossa, and immediately after the first victories. Events also had to be against him. Thus, his inability to win during 1941 and 1942 would seem to be logical.
Let's see the mistakes he had to make before operation Barbarossa.
German tanks and other kind of weapons and equipment had to have a very complicated design, and thus to be produced extremely slowly; whereas Russian weapons had to be much more standardized and be produced en masse. It permitted to explain the lack of tanks and aircrafts during battles against Russians during late 1941 and 1942 (and after of course), and thus, a part of the defeat.
He also had to declare the war too early. By declaring it just one year after the battle of France, the lack of proper equipment could be explained (and of course, the two front war).
By not making a total mobilization of Germany (regarding men and equipment) and not demanding an important effort from his allies as soon as 1941, the fact that he did not win in 1941 or 1942 could also be explain. And that was also made on purpose.
He had to start the operation too late. Thus, it would allow to explain why he wasn't able to win totally during Barbarossa.
The German army also had to lack winter equipment. This would allow to explain why they were forced to retreat during winter.
During operation Barbarossa and after, all the so called strategic mistakes or the supposedly reasonable decisions leading to a failure were of course made on purpose.
Not using Ukrainians, Latvians, Russians, etc.., as soldiers against the soviet regime was also intentional. With their help, Hitler would have got much more soldiers fighting for him; and things could have been very different (80 million of them were under German domination). But, as the real goal of Hitler the jew was to lose, using them was out of the question.
On the northern front, the two stops of 6 days each of the 56th Panzer Corps were necessary. Otherwise, Panzers of Army Group North would have taken Leningrad as soon as July. Then, maybe the entire Soviet north front would have fallen.
The 16th German Army also had to be diverted from rushing toward Leningrad. It had to help Army Group Center to fight on its left wing and thus losing precious days. And the 56th Panzer Corps had to be called to help the 16th Army near the 12th August. Otherwise, once again, maybe Leningrad would have been conquered.
On the center front, the decision of stopping the attack in order to help the northern front and the southern front (at Kiev) was also made with the purpose to make fail operation Barbarossa. If Germans had attacked Moscow near the 20th July 1941, they would have taken it during August or mid-September. And if Moscow had fallen, all the Soviets forces of the northern front would have fallen also, because the town was an enormous railroad and road center; thus the northern front wouldn't have been resupplied anymore. As Hitler had to lose the war against Russians, such a thing wasn't possible. So, Hitler had to suspend the attack against Moscow.
Of course, the salient of Kiev was a threat. But this salient was also made on purpose. Why would Stalin let such a salient with so many men inside when things went so bad, thus when there was such a risk of having it encircled by German? It was extremely dangerous. But in fact, it was made in order to justify the stop of Army group Center before Moscow. Without this salient, there was no reason for Army Group Center to stop attacking the center of the front. Then, front center would have fallen and the northern front would have fallen quickly after that. The fact that Stalin let his troops stay in this salient of Kiev during one month and a half (from the 15th July to the end of August) shows quite clearly that he wanted Germans to attack there and his one million soldiers to be made prisoners.
And finally, attacking Moscow at the end of September, when winter was almost there, was also made in order to make operation Barbarossa fail.
The fact that winter clothes weren't brought fast enough and that the weapons weren't adapted to the extreme cold of the Russian winter was once again something staged. It allowed to explain partly why Germans lost during the battle of Moscow.
Finally, the enormous quantities of German soldiers and weapons lost during 1941 permitted to explain why during 1942, Germans weren't able to attack on the entire front as they did in 1941.
In 1942, as Germans armies were now quite advanced in the Russian territory, the next attack from them had to lead to nowhere (regarding military strategy). They couldn't once again make major encirclements, as in 1941; because maybe Germans would have been able to destroy a part of the front, and things could have become quite dangerous for Russians. Germans making a lot of prisoners would also have been problematic for the end of 1942 and for 1943. Imagine Germans making 1 million prisoners. Then, the Russian counter-attack from fall of 1942 would normally have been much less successful. So, the attack had to be made in a part of the front where Russians could retreat, thus avoiding encirclements. And the main goal of Germans shouldn't be encirclements, but taking control of some territories. That way, Russians just retreating an not being killed or made prisoners wouldn't be so much of a problem for Germans.
This means Germans couldn't attack at the center of the front; because there, Russians couldn't retreat. Retreating would indeed have led to the fall of Moscow, and the fall of Moscow would have led to the fall of the northern front. Russians couldn't stay there and defend the Moscow area either. Because in this case, the problem is that normally an attack there would have been a success (since Germans were still quite powerful), and would have led to the conquest of Moscow by Germans, and thus to the fall of the northern front; and maybe to the destruction of front center. So, not retreating wouldn't have been a solution either.
The other possible side for the attack could have been the north. But an important advance there could have allowed to destroy the armies fighting against Finland and thus, to make a major breakthrough. Moscow and the center of the front would have been threatened. So, attacking there could have been dangerous for the plan of Jewish leaders.
This is why Hitler had to attack in the south. At the south, Russians could retreat on a long distance without losing crucial territories. And as the main goal of Hitler was to take oil (thus mainly to gain territory), German forces would not try very much to destroy Russian forces and to make a major breakthrough.
Regarding the goal of operation "case blue", the rest of the war showed that finally Germans didn't have so many problem of oil. They were able to produce enough oil to continue the war against Russians during 1943 and 1944. So, attacking there was far from being absolutely necessary. But, of course, this wrong estimation was once again voluntarily made by Hitler.
From the beginning, the operation was very hazardous, because it implied splitting Army Group South into two. And the group fighting the most would have a lot of Italian, Hungarian and Romanian troops, which were supposed to be much less reliable and less equipped than German ones. So, it was sure that with only a half of Army Group South and many soldiers of a lesser quality, it would be difficult to beat Russians. And of course, it would be much more difficult to make large encirclements and take many prisoners. But, as the goal was to lose this battle, it was a very good thing for Hitler.
The goal of reaching Stalingrad was strange. Normally, the goal of Germans should have been to reach the Caspian Sea as quickly as possible, in order to cut Russian troops located in the Caucasus from the rest of the Russian army. It would have been very difficult for Russians to prevent this from happening. And once this done, a little retreat from Germans wouldn't have opened Russians the way toward the Caucasus. Whereas with the strategy of taking only Stalingrad: first, the road toward the Caucasus wasn't entirely blocked; and second, if Stalingrad was taken back, the Russians could easily send reinforcements again toward the Caucasus.
However, Hitler's goal wasn't completely absurd or stupid (of course if he had got a genuine will of winning), because, without the oil of Caucasus, Russians would have been in a bad situation.
He was even quite close of reaching it. But once again, very fishy "mistakes", so called bad luck and fierce defense from Russians led him to lose.
First, surroundings of May 12-28 at Kharkov, leading to 270.000 Russian prisoners, and the fact that Stalin thought erroneously Germans would go to the north after Voronezh were required in order to allow Germans' first successes. Otherwise, Germans forces wouldn't have been able to advance so quickly and wouldn't have been so dispersed; thus the final success of Russian forces would have seemed fishier. So, Stalin perfectly knew they would go to the south, and the success at Kharkov was planned by Jewish leaders. It was the same thing regarding the ability of Russians to flee quickly enough not to be caught up by Germans. Normally, with their panzers, Germans should have been able to rejoin Russians and to overtake them very quickly. So, this strange ability to flee faster than the panzers was required for the success of the Jewish plan (which was: to let the Germans disperse themselves enormously, to let them be trapped in Stalingrad, to destroy a great part of the German forces at Stalingrad and after, and finally to make them retreat toward the front line of April 1942).
Second, encirclements were supposed to be one goal of this operation. But, after the first success, what a bad luck, each time they failed, either because of problems of supplies or because Soviet counter-attacks delayed their advance.
And at the beginning, Hitler thought wrongly that Russians were in full flight, thus, he didn't try to pursue them. This erroneous estimation of the situation was of course fully wanted.
Another justification of the lack of successful encirclements is that finally, encirclements weren't really a major goal of the operation. The main goal was to reach Stalingrad. So, Jewish leaders could justify that encirclements weren't pursue with all the necessary will because they were just a goal of secondary importance.
The third kind of voluntary "mistakes" was to split regularly the effort of his armies, leading to fatal delays regarding offensives and weaker attacks. The first of this kind was splitting Army Group South into two Army Groups (Groups A and B). The second one was making Fourth Panzer Army going to the south to help Army Group A to cross the Don (something justified by the fact that Hitler thought Russians were in full flight). It allowed to delay the success of the attack of Army group B (also to cross the Don). The third one was splitting Fourth Panzer army into two, with one part going toward the Caspian Sea and the second one toward Stalingrad. The fourth one was with Army Group South, one part going to the west and the other to the east.
Attacking Stalingrad was another voluntary "mistake". There was no reason at all to take Stalingrad. Germans were already controlling the roads leading to the south. But the plan of Jewish leaders was to make Germans lose at Stalingrad; so Hitler had to send them conquer the town. Creating a salient and leaving Italian, Romanian and Hungarian troops (that is weaker ones) defend the flanks, thus making sure that those wouldn't resist against Russian assaults, was once again intentional. Letting the 6th army stay in Stalingrad, even though Hitler knew there were tons of Russian troops amassing near his flanks was also wanted. Same thing about forbidding the 6th army to try to break out once it was surrounded.
Of course, withdrawing a substantial number of aircrafts to the Mediterranean Sea just before operation Uranus was also made with the purpose of making Germans lose at Stalingrad.
Not bombing oil fields of Baku during August, and bombing those of Grozny only between the 10th and the 12th October, was another false mistake.
We can also think that the weakening of Russian attacks at the beginning of 1942 was made in order to justify that Hitler got the impression that Russians were exhausted.